The field of psychology has a long history of attempting to make its basic science relevant to the analysis and solution of social problems. Some psychologists claim that it has been successful at this goal, but others are not convinced. Historically, the field has followed a linear model in its attempts at being relevant: Basic science is somehow developed first, and later someone comes along to apply it to solve problems in real-world settings. This model is now undergoing serious reconsideration in the physical and biological sciences. An alternative model in which science and practice develop seamlessly is represented in the remarkable career of Louis Pasteur. This article discusses both of these models in the context of psychological science and practice. Three fundamental principles underlying Pasteur's way of doing science and practice are presented. Adopting a Pasteurian framework should help resolve at least some of the debates about our science and practice linkage, but this will require a change in how professionals function and how future generations of professionals are trained. Suggestions are presented for making psychology more Pasteurian to help it achieve its stated goal "as a science, as a profession, and as a means of promoting human welfare."
More than 35 years ago, then-American Psychological Association (APA) president George Miller (1969) insightfully analyzed the issue of how well the science of psychology was responding to meeting societal needs. Indeed, the APA's own statement of principles directs its members to support psychology "as a science, as a profession, and as a means of promoting human welfare" (APA, 1954 ). Miller's classic phrase, "giving away psychology," was intended to encourage the scientific side of our profession to make greater efforts to infuse scientific knowledge into social practice. But he lamented, "Yet, I cannot escape the impression that we have been less effective than we might have been" (p. 1063).
By some lights, Miller's (1969) plea has been answered. Posing the question "Does psychology make a difference in our lives?" (also in an APA presidential address), Philip Zimbardo (2004) enthusiastically supported an affirmative answer of "yes, yes." His extensive review of the progress of psychology in the intervening years turned up a number of topics in which psychological science has been successfully used to both analyze and provide solutions for a significant number of social problems. Zimbardo clearly felt that the status of contemporary psychology showed that psychology had met Miller's challenge.
The victory, if any, is not unalloyed, however. An overview of many areas of the field reveals that there is a good deal of discontent in the social sciences generally and psychology as well with just this issue, with how little progress we are making in having significant effects in the "real world" on solving individual and societal problems. The field seems to be perpetually in a state of discussion, if not dispute, about problems with the goals and intentions of the profession (Driver-Linn, 2003) , its development and use of theories (Rychlak, 2000) , its reliance on the positivist approach (Slife & Williams, 1997) , its methods (Cook & Groom, 2003) , its techniques for interventions (Rice, 1997; Wandersman & Florin, 2000) , the value of empirical tests of treatment models (Davison, 1998; Kendall, 1998) , its linkages between basic and intervention research and public policy (Coyne & Racioppo, 2000; McCall, 1996) , and very recently, its failure to be applied to such critical social issues as global warming and energy conservation: "We look away . . . we do not have much to show in our collective scientific efforts" (Breckler, 2007, p. 28) . Perhaps even more critical are the notable "failures" such as the CHAMPUS Fort Bragg project (Bickman, 1996) and the Cambridge-Somerville youth project (McCord, 2003) . These major experiments are regarded as having failed in that their main predictions, derived from established theoretical and empirical principles, failed to receive support from the outcome results. It is this enterprise of applying basic science to real-world problems that is at the heart of the discussion presented here.
The complex and evolving relationship between science and practice has animated development of the profession of psychology for many decades now. The distinction has its own particular characteristics within the profession of psychology, per se, but the evolution of the relations between them has been strongly colored by how the distinction has worked out in the physical and biological sciences. Physics has commonly been regarded as the gold standard by which rigorous basic science can be transported into applied operations. The "strong inference" possible in the physical sciences (Platt, 1964 ) is often held up as a model for psychology (A. Kaplan, 1964) . In psychology, clinical practice is based on the framework established in the Boulder model (Benjamin & Baker, 2000; Raimy, 1950) , which requires training and practice to be based on empirically derived evidence. Although there has been some movement to supplant that model with greater practice emphasis (Rappoport, 1977 ; the Vermont Conference), it continues to reign as the dominant model at the interface of science and practice.
It should be of some concern to psychologists, therefore, that the assumed one-way linkage between basic science and practice has been challenged and is now undergoing deep scrutiny and possible revision. The revisionist argument is that the linear model is fundamentally inadequate in that it splits basic science from practice and ignores major historical traditions in which the two activities are not separated. The problems and controversies mentioned above are often related to that split and commonly blamed on such usual suspects as, for instance, that humans are more complex than electrons and that there is some degree of inherent uncertainty or unpredictability in the behavior of organisms that we will never eliminate no matter how good our science or our translations to the real world. The assumed solution, naturally, is to reduce the uncertainty as much as possible. How that is to be done is subject to many interpretations and recommendations: Better use of knowledge, better theories, better manipulations, and better measures are the most frequent suggestions. These are undisputable; every day and in every way we should strive to be better and better. But the argument I develop here suggests that attention must be paid at another level, that it is not just our theories, or just our measures, or just our manipulations or our interventions that need retooling; it is how these can be integrated with each other from the beginning, and how they should be logically and empirically linked as they evolve in a developmental progression.
I argue that the problem comes when we attempt to move from theory to practice. Although we may be proud of how we have used our science to improve lives (Zimbardo, 2004) , our adherence to this linear model to solve problems may in fact be restricting our ability to make the translation, and in fact it may be restricting our basic science developments as well. In our current traditional usage of linear models, either a theory is imported, whole cloth, into an empirical attack on a problem, or we attempt to solve a problem with whatever on-the-ground techniques seem most relevant or most useful. This is a one-way road, either way we choose to take it. We love our theories and reject them only grudgingly, as Kuhn argued (1962) . We can modify our theories by searching for moderators and mediators to keep the theoretical enterprise going (Baron & Kenny, 1986) . Alternatively, we can ignore theory and just use whatever ideas seem useful as we get into the trenches to work on the problem in whatever ways seem likely to "work." But at heart psychology lacks a formal model whereby the reality of the problem to be solved is integrated with basic science that is imported to solve it. The linear model forces a developmental and operational distinction between them. In fact, there are clear instances in this history of psychology in which applications issues were deliberately rejected as worthy of good science. Reich (1981) has shown how social psychologists after World War II wished to return to basic science and actively encouraged a split between basic science activities and pursuit of problems. Researchers interested in basic science split from those who wanted to pursue industrial applications (thus leading to the founding of the National Training Laboratory). That split has never healed. Maybe investigators and practitioners have no desire to create a melding, but the linear model would seem to discourage any thinking about how to try it.
Reign of the Linear Model
The linear model has been the target of a searching review, and in fact a revision, in a ground-breaking study by Stokes (1997 (Bush, 1990) , reviewed current practice and then laid down a policy framework for postwar science in the United States. Bush emphasized the critical nature of basic research, research performed for its own sake with no concern for applications. In fact, he emphasized that basic and applied science were antithetical, and attempts to link them should be avoided. He was quite clear on this: "Applied research drives out pure" (Bush, 1990, p. 18) . He insisted that federal support go to basic science to the virtual exclusion of applied research. This is the core of what Stokes called the linear model. This principle became the foundation of the soonto-be established National Science Foundation. Since then, most science developments, and much of professional psychology as well, have followed this model.
In psychology, however, the practitionerproblem solver model became more prominent in the early 1950s, arising in response to government support of mental health research and service, largely because of the national need arising from the returning war veterans in need of mental health services. This became established in the National Institute of Mental Health. Interestingly, however, the linear model of science to practice was a central pivot concern even in this new national policy. As McCall (1996) has noted, however, Congress eventually became displeased with that mentality, feeling that it was not enough that applications could be put off by trusting "someone, somehow, someday" to do something useful with the science. Applicability has become a motivating force behind governmental support of psychology, but even in responding to those pressures, psychology nevertheless generally has adhered to the linear model in professional practice and, tellingly, in the training of its future professionals. I devote a section of my later discussion to just this issue.
Classical examples of the linear model abound in psychology, and I examine various components of these approaches throughout this discussion. Briefly, some major examples are drive reduction theory, mathematical learning theory, connectionism, Gestalt psychology, attribution theory, and "rational man" models in economic theory. Some of these broad, overarching approaches played major roles in psychologists' application efforts, such as attribution theory's becoming attribution therapy in clinical research and practice, whereas others, such as Gestalt psychology, remained as an approach with no direct applicability. Their utility is or is not a concern, depending on the goal of the theorist, but psychology as a means of promoting human welfare needs to find ways to integrate the impressive conceptual power of such approaches with real-world concerns. Review of a successful model of how it can be done follows.
Revisionist Approach and
Pasteur's Quadrant Stokes (1997) concluded that the linear model is not necessarily a superior model, and he showed that history is replete with examples of outstanding science clearly based on motivations for doing both pure science and applying science to solving problems simultaneously. His focus on the research career of Louis Pasteur provides a paradigm case of the value of our rethinking the linear model. Stokes (1997) cast scientific motivations in the form of a two-dimensional "quadrant" model. One dimension categorizes science by a yes-no category of "Is it focused on a quest for fundamental understanding?" The second, cross-cutting yes-no category is "Does it involve considerations of use and applications to solving practical problems?" Three of these four quadrants are characterized by relatively clearcut examples in the physical and biological sciences. In this article, I extend that logic to investigate the science-practice split in psychology. The "no theory-no practical considerations" quadrant is empty in Stokes's scheme and is not discussed further here.
High Basic Science, High Use Oriented
This is the Pasteurian quadrant that was the main focus of Stokes's (1997) review. Pasteur initially began his career in physics and chemistry, but very early on his interests and laboratory skills evolved into what ultimately became biochemistry and microbiology. This came about because of because of his engagement with the problems faced by French vintners concerned about wine spoilage. Throughout a brilliant career, his easy movement between basic science and testing solutions to food industry problems established many of the pivots of modern medicine and public health and disease prevention and treatment.
High Basic Science, Low Use Oriented
This Bohrian quadrant is exemplified by the realm of pure physics. The chief model is the physicist Neils Bohr, whose main focus was on investigating the fundamental structure of the atom with no practical considerations in mind. Indeed, this was the goal sought by Vannevar Bush. Physics provides probably the clearest example of science pursued for the sake of basic understanding, per se. At the core of this development, the main motivation is fundamental understanding, with little or no concern with practical problems.
Low Basic Science, High Use Oriented
Thomas Edison, inventor of numerous highly useful and indeed revolutionary products, provided Stokes (1997) with his third quadrant, the Edisonian quadrant. During Edison's long and amazingly productive career (he received more than 1,000 patents), he continually proclaimed his commitment to practical manipulation of practical real-world phenomena by bench-based trial-and-error experimentation rather than by following theory-based principles. Israel (1998) has concluded, "But Edison ultimately was an inventor, not a scientist. He was concerned with making things and did not consider it his place to develop theory or add to the scientific literature" (p. 471). Edison himself was quoted as saying, "Well, I'm not a scientist, I'm an inventor" (Josephson, 1959, p. 283) . His desire to make products for the marketplace created entire industries and fundamentally altered people's daily lives, having perhaps as much worldwide influence as Pasteur. But he did not rely on basic science and left no legacy of theory or basic science worth passing on to future generations.
Successful Science and Practice: Three Key Principles of Pasteur's Approach
Following the Stokes (1997) model, we now have a framework for rethinking psychology's commitment to the linear model. There are a number of pure science and pure application strands in contemporary psychology (the Bohrian and Edisonian models, respectively), but the field's formal statement of the linear model (again, "as a science, as a profession, and as a means of promoting human welfare") strongly suggests a slant toward endorsement of the linear model. But, following Stokes's logic, rejecting the linear model and adopting a Pasteurian framework for the science-practice nexus will require some rethinking about our traditional theoretical and applied activities. To do this, an in-depth analysis of Pasteur's own work reveals a set of three principles that can help us develop a foundation for a more Pasteurian melding of science and practice in psychology. I first describe those principles in the physical and biological sciences, and then I focus specifically on psychology examples and how those principles can illuminate a new linkage between science and practice. I begin my considerations by asking, how was Pasteur able to carry out his new science? What was available to him, and how was he able to make such enormously influential advancements as he worked, concurrently and interactively, at both basic and applied activities?
Initially operating as a chemist, Pasteur was investigating the crystal structure of forms of tartaric acid, analyzing its optical properties with no consideration of any particular usefulness of his findings. He discovered that there are two basic, complementary chemical forms of tartaric acid, only one of which was biologically active. Discovering the two distinct forms resolved a major dispute among chemists, and the immediate national fame brought him to the attention of French wine growers. Racemic acid, one of the two subgroups of tartaric acid, is common in grape juice, and wine growers in France approached him to help them discover why fermentation in wine production was failing at an unacceptably high rate. The pure crystals he discovered in his laboratory tests were identical to the crystals he found in batches of spoiled wine. This led him to the discovery of bacterial agents, some of which functioned in the absence of oxygen (anaerobic bacteria), contaminating the effects of yeast; this practical problem led him back into a new understanding of the fundamental properties of bacteria. He discovered that gently heating wine to 55°C for 2 min (now called pasteurization) would eliminate contaminating microorganisms, allowing alcohol fermentation to progress normally. This proved that fermentation was a biological process, not a strictly chemical process, thus establishing the science of microbiology (Cuny, 1963 ). Pasteur's ability to isolate different classes of bacteria led him to study other practical problems, such as the manufacture of beer and milk, with almost immediate improvements in the technology of production. It is important to note that his fundamental work on the science of microbiology was, at the same time, simultaneously focused on crystal structure and the structure and function of germs and practical problems in fermentation and immunization and the development of vaccines.
With the foundations of microbiology now firmly established, Pasteur focused his attention on the microbial agents involved in infection in silkworm disease, anthrax in cattle, rabies in animals, and smallpox in humans (Dubos, 1988; Porter, 1998) . By midcareer, he had firmly vanquished alternative explanations of fermentation ("spontaneous generation") and, along with Robert Koch, established germ theory as the major explanatory model for the biological sciences and, notably, medical practice. I discuss germ theory qua theory in more detail shortly. Stokes (1997) showed how a number of other major scientific activities were infused with practical considerations. German chemists were working out the formulas for chemicals that established the pharmaceutical industry. In the United States, basic physics was applied to materials that had desirable properties for the electronics industry. Note that these developments involved the concurrent, not linear, integration of asking pure science questions with a distinct motivation for making the discoveries relevant to the real world, and where the real world sets the parameters of the relevant theory and empirical practice. The action was at the level of the interaction. Our question here is, Can psychologists can achieve a similar level of success?
To explore this question, I next review three fundamental principles that enabled Pasteur to achieve success at the levels of both science and practice. I believe that these principles can be effectively used in moving psychology from the linear to a Pasteurian model. I first describe the principles as they appear in Pasteur's work and in the physical and biological sciences and then revisit them in the context of psychological science and practice.
Principle of Invariance of Units of Analysis
One key to understanding why Pasteur was so successful was his ability to establish stability and invariance in his basic units of analysis. Units are invariant to the extent that they are uniquely characterized by a set of properties shared by all the members of that class of units but not shared fully by any others. Thus they are inclusive but distinctive classes of phenomena.
When Pasteur investigated the causes of infection such as bacilli, he had the advantage of unit invariance because his basic observations involved left-and right-angled crystals. One left-angled crystal is for all purposes identical to any other left-angled crystal. He actually evaporated the tartaric acid samples and picked out the left-and right-angled crystals one by one with a microscope and a fine-pointed needle. Within each class, the investigator can find crystals identical to each other and distinctly different from the other class of crystals. The same invariance applies to tartaric acid, bacilli, fermented wine samples, and so on throughout the realm of physical and biological sciences that have established classifications of basic elements.
Science abounds with similar examples. Bohr's great advancements in atomic physics were based on invariant units such as electrons, protons, and so forth. These are stable phenomena and do not vary in time or space; a potassium ion measured in New York will be identical to one in Moscow. Marie and Pierre Curie studied X-rays, and the ones they studied are identical to those now being studied. Chemistry has the basic building blocks of atoms as reflected in the periodic chart of the atoms familiar in all chemistry classrooms around the world. The genomic revolution is based on the discovery of the four fundamental building blocks of genetic material (A, G, T, and C).
Principle of Control
The world is causally messy, and our understanding of events is often clouded and uncertain. Analysis of any phenomenon and the development of any practical approach to it requires a clear target, as accurate a view as uncontaminated with other variables as possible. This requires that all covarying and confounding factors either be controlled out or systematically varied. Pasteur's form of control was exercised in the laboratory settings (sterilized petri dishes, pipettes, etc. eliminate contamination).
Beyond the biological level, control is also a central feature when, for example, businesses establish quality control mechanisms to ensure product uniformity and safety. Governments control their money supply and set laws with clear-cut criteria (a blood alcohol level higher than .08 makes it legal to arrest drunk drivers). Speed limits are enforced by police. Public health agencies set sanitation standards. National bankers and federal economists set interest rates, bond rates, prime rates, and so forth to control economic activity. Most forms of governmental action involve control in some form.
Principle of Logical Validity
The concept of validity has a long and complex history, at least in psychology, and a large body of literature and empirical practice has grown up around the many uses of the term. The central concern here revolves around the logic of explanation; the concern is with the confidence we can place in someone's assertion that a given cause "really" is a true cause of an observed phenomenon (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002; Borsboom, Mellenberg, & van Heerden, 2004) .
As Pasteur worked on the problems of infection, he had to modify his understanding of the nature of bacteria and his methods of working with them to achieve better infection control. The dominant theory up until his era was the theory of spontaneous generation, the theory that living entities can arise from nonliving materials (e.g., rotting straw or damp rags). Although controversial among certain researchers at the time, supporters and critics were arguing largely over methodology, and there was no dominant opposing theory. Spontaneous generation was a conceptual model that guided thinking about technical questions and even philosophical ones much as Kuhn (1962) defined a "dominant paradigm." But Pasteur's work created an alternative model, the germ theory. He showed that nothing would "spontaneously generate" if biological materials were isolated from air and other substances that might carry microorganisms. So it was airborne contaminants that should be controlled, and from his many compelling laboratory demonstrations, germ theory quickly became accepted as the dominant model for studying fermentation and, later in his career, diseases. The public health movement has come directly from the widespread acceptance of germ theory, per se, and its attendant empirical procedures (Magner, 2005) .
Pasteur's rethinking of the concept of life could be considered a matter of construct validity. One definition of validity elucidates this point: The Living Webster Encyclopedia Dictionary of the English Language (1974) provides this conceptualization: "Valid . . . (in logic): derived correctly from premises already accepted." This usage focuses on the development of axioms, premises, and definitional assumptions that establishes a logical framework for proceeding conceptually and empirically. The central issues for both science and practice are not necessarily empirical, but logical. When we establish "premises already accepted" and think in terms of "derived logically from theory," then we can be clearer about how science and practice can be linked logically and empirically. This allows the development of a framework capable of allowing strong inference (Platt, 1964) . The heart of logical validity is the development of a set of concepts with clear linkages to each other and, in a Pasteurian approach, with the parameters of the problem to be solved. Thaggard (1996) succinctly stated this aspect of the Pasteurian revolution this way: "The transition to the germ theory of disease produced dramatic conceptual changes as the result of a radically new view of disease causation" (p. 445).
When the Pasteurian sets out to solve a problem, theory and problem properties and potential solutions evolve concurrently and interactively, so it is less likely that the features of a particular problem have to be translated from the applied setting into a preexisting theory of model, with errors of translation and trimming and modifying to make it fit. Kuhn (1962) has argued how prevalent this forcing is in the history of science. But in a Pasteurian framework, the necessity of grasping the fundamentals of the problem infuses the activity with a heavy slant toward empirical facts. Pasteur's formulation of germs and infection gave him a logical structure, a theory, that guided his interpretation of what kinds of relationships to investigate, what kinds of elements should be targeted and which controlled, and what manifestations of disease are expected to appear under which kinds of infection conditions. It is the underlying logic of causation that evolved from his simultaneous basic science and applied concerns that has made germ theory one of the major intellectual and practice accomplishments in human history.
Examples of Pasteurian Principles Prevalent in Psychology
Extending these three fundamental principles from Pasteur to psychology, I review a wide range of core psychological examples, some historical, some more contemporary, that show that psychology has its own successes in systematically using these principles. With these instances, I am able to suggest ways in which the constraints imposed by linear thinking can be overcome and a more integrated and integrative solution to George Miller's (1969) lament can be achieved.
Unit Invariance
Some obvious examples of invariant units in common use in psychology follow.
Demographic units. Age, sex, income, employment status, education level, and so forth are nearly universally assessed in the social sciences. Scores on these variables may be discrete or continuous, but they vary in known, distinct, countable units and are comparable across times and situations.
Biological and physiological units. Also of great utility in psychology, biological or physiological response systems can be cast in an invariant unit framework. Heart rate (systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, and variability), galvanic skin response, cortisol, interleukin-2, interleukin-6, adrenalin, dopamine, serotonin, and so forth are all routinely studied in measures of stress and show reliable relationships with known stress parameters (Charney, 2004) . Also, they are measurable in units that are invariant and are comparable across times and situations.
Learning and behavioral units. Theorists have used units of learning processes such as the rate or frequency of responses (bar presses, pecks on disks, 80% correct responding, etc.) as measures of the amount of learning an organism is achieving. In child language development, phonemic linguistic units are commonly used to reflect speech comprehension and production. Motor responses assessed as correct versus incorrect invariantly reflect skill acquisition.
Social relations units. Social networks and socially supportive relationships, as well as negative social ties, have been found to be related to successful adaptation. Invariant units studied in this tradition involve such variables as marital status; the presence and/or number of family members; social network size; social connectedness, such as the number of functions served by relatives and friends; and so forth. These variables can tap critical social resources available in times of stress, and again, they are based on discrete countable and invariant units.
Control in Psychology's Studies
Many of the classes of invariant units in psychology just described are also controllable.
Some relevant examples demonstrate our progress with this principle.
Stimulus control. Laboratory control over biological, sensory, and learning conditions is a fundamental requirement in psychological research. Animal research is conducted in controlled laboratory conditions. Skinnerian learning models carefully control reinforcement rates preceding and following organisms' responses, tracing the growth of behavioral repertoires related to controlled reinforcement rates. Studies of visual, auditory, and motor processes in the science of psychophysics use standardized and controlled levels of sensory inputs, achieving reliable relationships such as power laws between stimulation and sensation.
Assessmental control. The importance of control over the kinds of person-level variables has long been the standard of measurement in the domain of psychometrics. This is based on standardization of instructions to participants, careful training of test administrators, and standardized testing and scoring procedures. Statistical control has been infused into assessment scaling such as Guttman reproducibility analysis and Thurstonian equal-appearing intervals methodology. Additionally, therapeutic assessments are often manualized for standardization across testing personnel and situations.
Experimental and quasi-experimental control. When there are actual manipulations of conditions, such as in laboratory studies of stress, standardization of research methodology is common and in fact expected: Experimental groups, control groups, and random assignment are central features. When they are not possible or feasible, Campbell and Stanley (1963) and Shadish et al. (2002) have devised a logical conceptual structure, quasi-experimental design, for analyzing causal relations that can help rule out plausible rival explanations.
Logical Validity in Psychology
Psychology has a long history of developing theories of the mind and behavior, and logical validity is a key to how such work is to be conducted.
Theories in clinical psychology. Although it may come as a surprise, an in-depth analysis of the theory of the mind and mental illness by Sigmund Freud represents a clear example of the use of the principle of logical validity as derivation from already-accepted principles. His early tripartite characterization of personality encouraged therapists to develop methods of dream interpretation, recollection of memories, the "talking cure," and unstructured interviewing, among other methods. These concepts were all logical derivations from his model of how the mind and its constituent parts, the id, the ego, and the superego, developed and functioned. Interestingly, the theory shows a strong Pasteurian bent as well, as it attempted to develop explanatory constructs based on close clinical observation and therapeutic treatment of patients. Although not now a popular theory, in fact Freud was a practicing clinician who was using a logically structured theoretical model, and he created a close connection between his experiences with patients and the theoretical concepts he used in psychotherapy.
The approach to psychotherapy of Carl Rogers (1995) is another example of a close tie between the logic of the underlying theory and the nature of the operations intended to solve a problem. Rogers's theory defined a client as having a healthy self-concept when his or her self-regard is unconditional; to have conditional self-regard is unhealthy in this theory; it is so by definition, and it is not an empirical issue. Rogerian therapy is completely linked with the key logical components of this model, having been developed in actual sessions with his patients.
Theories of social cognition. Theories and models of cognitive processes are fundamental in many areas of social psychological science. The area had early beginnings with the approach to social cognition of Fritz Heider (1958) , who formulated a theory of cognitions of everyday life. Very much established at the basic science level (with no operations or methods for promoting human welfare), his approach influenced other investigators' own developments of models of cognition.
In psychology, personality researchers have constructed models of personality variables such as locus of control (Rotter, 1966) , achievement motivation (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) , and authoritarianism (Adorno, FrenkelBrunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) on theoretical grounds alone. Many theories of the mind and behavior have relied heavily on abstract models of reasoning and cognitive processes, for example, connectionist theory (Bechtel, 1991) , ab-stract mathematical models (Healy, Kosslyn, & Shiffrin, 1992) , and dynamical systems theories (Thelen & Smith, 1996) . Note, though, that the concept of parallel distributed processing, for example, only has meaning given to it by a particular version of connectionist theory. Our concern here is to emphasize that research with these models is derived from constructs hypothesized by the theory to be operating not because of their empirical properties but because of the requirements set down by the logic of the theory itself.
Infusing the Pasteurian Model Into
Contemporary Psychology
Next, I compare and contrast the linear and the Pasteurian models for psychology's pledge of linking science and practice. The Pasteurian approach is likely to prove superior to the linear model in this. As usually used, in the linear model the investigator has to develop a solution provided by the theoretical model. In effect, the problem is imported into the theoretical framework, and selected techniques that make sense within the framework of the model are then developed and implemented. However, because the theory and the problem did not evolve concurrently, the investigator has to selectively translate the problem's properties into the language of the theory, and it is this translation that is at risk for slippage between theory and problem. This may well be a major reason why the field has experienced disappointments in some of its major social interventions, as discussed in the beginning of the article regarding the Fort Bragg and CambridgeSomerville projects. We can guess, though, that the problems of translating from a separately developed basic science to a particular problem not inherently considered in the science itself are at least somewhat likely to be greater in a linear than in a Pasteurian approach. This question surely deserves more intensive analysis.
In initiating a Pasteurian approach, any basic invariant units, principles of control, and logical derivation from established principles all have to be matched to the properties of the problem needing solution. Consciously following these can provide clear guidelines as to what to search for in understanding the problem in situ and then integrating scientific methods of control and logical validity to guide integrated basic science and applications concurrently. I provide examples of these steps below.
In sum, the evidence I have reviewed has shown that in fact the basic principles of Pasteurian science are alive and well in some of areas of psychology. This growth no doubt has been unsystematic if not haphazard because it appears that the teaching of the structure of Pasteurian science is virtually absent in professional training in psychology It may also be because practice has been relegated to a secondclass status given the primacy of the linear and Bohrian models in our training models. Nevertheless, the seeds are there. But we have to ask, should we deliberately make the Pasteurian model the standard of practice in psychology and have it replace the linear model?
Three issues are fundamental to formulating a comprehensive answer to this question: (a) The field is already committed to the importance of applications ("and as a means of promoting human welfare"), so that pledge would seem to encourage us to do so; (b) as discussed earlier, there are frequent complaints about the functioning and usefulness of the science, suggesting that at least some of our shortcomings may be because of the splitting apart of science and practice, again encouraging us to do so; and (c) the strong bias in favor of the linear model apparently obscures from us the desirability of having practical problems feeding back into basic science, altering it as needed to meet the exigencies of dealing with the real world. One unsettling conclusion of our current one-way bias is that we may be led to think that we are such terrific theorists and amazingly good scientists that we do not need to need know anything about the world of applications to consider our science successful.
This third issue needs some deeper consideration, in that it leads us to ask, where do psychologists get their basic science? Perhaps we can best think of the history of psychology (and current times) as on a continuum, ranging from the very practical, problem-based science such as human factors psychology on up to very abstract theories such as those concerning the self or basic models of cognitive processes. Basic science is somehow there, but obscure in its origins. Confronting this issue of the origins of our basic science raises the issue of what I call here backward influence. In principle, in the linear model a scientist tests a theory or concept in the laboratory and makes adjustment to the model as the data come in. The well-known "death of a beautiful theory by a nasty fact" (William James) suggests great flexibility in the creation of basic science. But there is little or no proof in most psychological science that the science got rejected because reality did not work the way it was supposed to. When we follow the linear model, we are in danger of finding reasons why the science is right and the practice and application is wrong. We have seen some hints of in this in McCord's (2003) discussion of the Cambridge-Somerville youth project and Bickman's (1996) discussion of the CHAMPUS Fort Bragg experiment. Thomas Kuhn (1962) has given us insight into this danger in his insightful discussion of the reluctance of scientists to modify their models, clinging to them and even refusing to acknowledge violations of paradigms.
As examples, McCord (2003) noted that the theory-based evaluations of the CambridgeSomerville Youth Study predicted that the therapeutic treatment of the at-risk youths would be reflected in improved delinquency behaviors. That was the goal of the assessment, and subjective reports by the youths and people who knew them reported improvement. However, no one assessed later delinquent behavior, which was found to be greater in the treatment condition than in the control condition. The theory and attendant expectations blinded the evaluators to what was actually happening with the youths over the course of their growth into middle age. As for the failure of the Fort Bragg program to improve the outcomes of clinical treatment of children, Bickman (1996) noted that "the Demonstration represented the type of system reform that advocates for children's services thought was critical" (pp. 690 -692); "researchers need to be moved outside their comfortable laboratory setting to study services in community settings" (p. 699).
Even if it could be argued that whereas the backward influence flow from practice to science is an improvement over no influence at all, nevertheless it also still implies a sciencepractice split and is itself inferior to a fully integrative model in which both grow and modify together to a higher level of integration. So, as we try to discover where our basic science comes from, by moving to a more Pasteurian approach, we can allow practice to modify science at the beginning. The linear model in which the world is bent to the science has to be refashioned so that it is possible, in fact desirable, to have the science bending to the world. The two examples I discuss shortly illuminate how this can occur. An established model of how it can be instituted is presented next.
Concept of Grounded Theory, With Examples
Ways in which science and practice can be better integrated have received considerable discussion in other aspects of the social sciences, although there is much less discussion about this in psychology. Pathways by which psychology could become more Pasteurian are available in the grounded theory paradigm (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1997) . Developed specifically to reject the theory-to-practice model, the grounded theory approach proposes that the investigator immerse him-or herself in the problem or situation of interest. Intense but unbiased observation of the many facets of the event, its causes and its consequences, and any related phenomena all feed into a search for causal relationships and theories or models to account for those relationships. The final product is a theory of the phenomenon tied directly to the phenomenon itself. In this resultant product, internal and external validity as traditionally used by psychologists are essentially guaranteed. I wish to emphasize, though, the critical value of unit invariance and logical validity as well; our melding of theory and practice in a Pasteurian framework is more likely to succeed to the extent that we use the principles as successfully as other sciences.
The first example of the close integration of basic science and practical problem analysis and solution is represented in the work of Robert Cialdini (1980 Cialdini ( , 1993 . Concerned about the potentially harmful effects of undue social influence techniques (such as those exerted by unscrupulous salespeople), he conducted a series of investigations of how such techniques were used in realworld settings to gain a basic understanding of the mechanisms underlying such techniques. To do so, he "went undercover" and undertook actual training in the roles of auto, fire alarm, and vacuum cleaner salespeople. From these professionals in the field, he came to understand the basic principles of social influence. These principles were then later tested and extended in laboratory and field settings. He was following the principles of "full-cycle social psychology," which he had established earlier (Cialdini, 1980) . In this model, a phenomenon is observed in its natural setting, questions and hypotheses about its basic principles are asked and answered in controlled laboratory settings, and the answers to those questions are verified or rejected by being retested back in the original settings. Thus, there is a close integration of science and practice functioning concurrently in this type of model, one very close to Pasteur's own approach.
A second example of the close integration of theory building and practical applications is demonstrated in the work of Price and Behrens (2003) . Their focus is on community and neighborhood development. With a focus on improving community life by building community capacities, the project they discussed is intended to extend Bandura's (1985) concept of selfefficacy to techniques for enhancing "collective efficacy." This project moved the individuallevel concept of self-efficacy to the community level, and in doing so moved at the level of obtaining new knowledge (e.g., "What are the determinants of collective efficacy?") while simultaneously building in leadership structures for more effective community problem solving. Focused on a community leadership development program, they engaged communityresiding individuals in programs to enhance their communities' collective effectiveness. This project innovatively moved the individuallevel concept of self-efficacy to the community level, and in doing so followed a goal of obtaining new knowledge (e.g., "What are the determinants of collective efficacy?") while simultaneously building in leadership structures for more effective community problem solving.
Implications for Training in the Pasteurian Approach
Revising the linear model by shifting to a more Pasteurian approach will require a different type of functioning for professionals and new models of training for future researchers and practitioners. Adequate training for the future will require students to have equal-or nearequal training in both theoretical, conceptual, and methodological sophistication and sophistication in real-world observational skills linked with on-the-ground problem analysis and problem-solution methodology. Although we are very good at the former in many areas of psychology, we are lacking in the latter. A few examples can be located. Practicum in the clinical psychology curriculum serves this purpose well but is typically not oriented to the formulation of basic science development. Other areas of training such as educational psychology, human factors psychology, and certainly industrial-organizational psychology are at least nominally engaged in real-world immersion. The development of a basic science-applications nexus even in these areas is not always clear. The grounded theory approach is virtually nonexistent in psychology's methodology curricula at both the undergraduate and the graduate levels. Stokes's (1997) analysis suggests more equal weighting of both in training. This means setting curriculum requirements to include didactic experience with a full range of experimental and quasi-experimental exemplars (Reich, 1982) , extensive mentored training in field observation techniques; full immersion in actual problem settings; formal training in intervention techniques, including program operation and evaluation and intervention testing and evaluation, all within a context of our powerful basic science theories and methods. All of these components are already present in many different versions in many areas of the social sciences, and it should not be an insuperable task for psychology to adopt them in a Pasteurian framework.
Summary and Conclusions Stokes (1997) has introduced the Pasteurian quadrant model in such a way as to reconsider the basic versus applied distinction that has characterized much of the discourse on the role of science in society for decades. This revision opens up avenues for psychologists to think about their own commitment to linking basic science and practice. The thrust of our discussion of Stokes's contribution is to rethink psychology's commitment to the linear model and the value of adopting a Pasteurian approach. I believe that attention to the three principles of unit invariance, control-covariation, and logical validity should provide the core of what future training in psychology should be and how current professionals should respond in this new world if we are to be true to our pledge "as a means of promoting human welfare."
